Pakistan has been blamed for Afghanistan’s miseries ever since its creation, and today it has become fashionable for our pseudo-intellectuals to bash Pakistan’s Afghan policy without questioning Afghanistan’s own misadventures against Pakistan since 1947.
While intellectuals and opinion-makers across the spectrum—from the religious right to the secular left—are critical of Pakistan’s historical stance on Afghanistan, there is near-total consensus inside Afghanistan regarding their aggressive anti-Pakistan policies.
Many Pakistanis may be surprised to learn that Afghanistan was the only country to oppose the creation of Pakistan and later its entry into the UN (Hasan 1962:16), making it the sole initiator of hostility against a newly born nation on the basis of the 1893 Durand Line Agreement.
Afghanistan has repeatedly attempted to seize Pakistan’s western provinces of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which constitute 67% of Pakistan’s territory. Much has been said about Pakistan Army’s so-called “strategic depth” policy, but it is crucial to note that Afghanistan has long served as a base camp for anti-Pakistan subversion, providing safe havens for terrorists, first by sheltering and training Baloch separatists since 1948 and then by fueling the Pashtunistan movement to incite hatred and terror.
All these events are part of Afghanistan’s Pakistan policy long before the term “strategic depth” was ever coined. It is unfair to blame Pakistan for reacting to Afghan aggression. One would be either totally naive or outright foolish not to oppose such aggression, which threatens 67% of our total land area and 31% of our population.
Justification of Strategic Depth
From what I have learned, strategic depth is not an India-centric policy but rather a rational solution aimed at securing a peaceful region. It seeks to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a political brothel for the rest of the world. In light of the facts mentioned above, it is now evident that Afghanistan is to be blamed for its current miserable condition.
Strategic depth is a reactionary policy in response to Afghanistan’s anti-Pakistan stance. Therefore, those who are critical of this reactionary policy must first convince Afghanistan to abandon its interference in Pakistan’s internal matters.
Durand Line and Afghan Pride
One of Afghanistan’s major problems is its nationalism, which is filled with ethnic hatred and historical mythologies that prevent large segments of Afghan society from embracing reality. This makes it difficult for them to comprehend the sensitivities of issues like the Durand Line and Pashtunistan.
In 1947, Kabul refused to accept the Durand Line, demarcated in 1893. According to the original English version of the agreement, the Durand Line was to be regarded as an international border, and its status was not to be changed. Thus, Pakistan was both morally and legally compelled to inherit the North-Western provinces following a formal referendum. Unjustifiably, many Afghans regard this as an insult to their national pride.
Insecure Afghan Identity
Afghan nationalism, as I have studied it, is more about senseless ethnic pride than substance. The very definition of Afghan identity alienates 52% of its population and exclusively accommodates Pashtuns.
Afghanistan is home to about 12 ethnic groups apart from Pashtuns, yet technically, they are not considered “Afghans.” Historically, the term “Afghan” originally referred to Pashtuns, or more specifically, indigenous peoples inhabiting lands between the Amu Darya and the Indus River. Meanwhile, other ethnic communities—particularly the Tajiks and Hazaras, who form the second and third largest groups—have justifiably opposed this exclusivity. Thus, Afghanistan faces a national dilemma in integrating its own people under a single national umbrella.
Afghanistan’s insecurity about its own identity has always played an instrumental role in shaping its anti-Pakistan policy. For the past 15 years, Afghanistan has relied on propaganda to demonize Pakistan before its citizens. According to their perspective, uniting their people requires using Pakistan as a scapegoat for all their problems, including their fractured national identity.
The Bitter Reality: Hate for Pakistan is in Afghan DNA
For years, I believed that only an Islamic regime like the Taliban would help bring Afghanistan and Pakistan closer together. However, I have now been proven wrong. The ongoing crisis has made it clear that the hatred for Pakistan is embedded in Afghan DNA, regardless of whether the Taliban are in power or not.
Recent events underscore this undeniable truth. Since the Taliban’s return in 2021, their actions toward Pakistan have been no different from those of previous Afghan governments. Border tensions have escalated, TTP militants have found sanctuary in Afghanistan, and the Taliban have refused to recognize the Durand Line. Instead of working toward regional stability, they continue their traditional hostility toward Pakistan.
Even as Pakistan facilitated the U.S.-Taliban talks, provided economic aid, and hosted millions of Afghan refugees for decades, Afghanistan’s response has been treacherous. The recent border clashes, Taliban rhetoric against Pakistan, and continued TTP attacks from Afghan soil are a stark reminder that Pakistan has been delusional in expecting brotherly relations with Afghanistan. The myth that Islamic rule in Kabul would bridge the gap between our two nations has now been shattered.
Pakistan’s Apologetic Behavior
Despite Afghanistan’s relentless hostility, Pakistan has repeatedly resorted to a policy of silence and appeasement, portraying Afghanistan as a “brotherly Muslim country.”
Historically, Pakistan has ignored provocative Afghan statements, such as Kabul’s refusal to acknowledge the Durand Line even under a pro-Pakistan Taliban regime (Rashid 2001: 254). However, there have been moments when Pakistan effectively countered Afghanistan’s baseless claims.
For instance, Pakistan’s first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, defiantly stated:
“The Government of Pakistan is willing to establish friendly relations with the Royal Government of Afghanistan. They cannot be expected forever to continue pleading for friendship, and while they have not given up hopes that sanity will dawn on the rulers of Afghanistan, they must reiterate in clear unambiguous language that not one inch of our land will be surrendered to anybody.” (qtd in Chopra 1974: 313)
Concluding Remarks
- Afghanistan’s hostility toward Pakistan on the basis of the Durand Line, especially from 1947-1988, has largely been driven by India and Russia (Hasan 1962, Tahir-Kheli 1974).
- Kabul’s Pakhtunistan policy was a failed scheme, particularly under King Zahir and Sardar Daud, as it was primarily aimed at suppressing internal opposition. The same logic can be applied against Afghanistan to fragment its state, which is why it should abandon such ethnic movements in Pakistan.
- Afghanistan must abandon its counterproductive anti-Pakistan narratives. The idea that Pakistan will relinquish 58% of its territory and 32% of its population to Pashtun nationalism is not only naive but outright idiotic.
- Pakistan will survive, but Afghanistan won’t. Afghanistan once believed that Pakistan would collapse, staking claims over Pakistani territory in anticipation of such an eventuality (Hasan 1962). However, unlike Afghanistan, Pakistan has strong institutions, a functional state, and diplomatic influence to counter any Afghan hostility, militarily or politically.
Final Thoughts
Afghanistan has never been strong enough to dismember Pakistan, while Pakistan has the capability to inflict irreparable damage on Afghanistan—a reality proven time and again in recent history. If Afghanistan is foolish enough to provoke Pakistan once more, it should be prepared for consequences it cannot sustain.
It is imperative that Afghanistan radically reviews its Pakistan policy. Disengaging from the Durand Line issue and abandoning its Pashtunistan agenda are the only paths toward rebuilding a stable and prosperous Afghanistan.
